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This essay reviews defined contnbution pension return guarantees typically made
by governments in connection with pension privatizations.  Finance theory related to the
pricing of options provides a unifying framework for evaluating the cost of these
guarantees.  The essay considers two types of guarantees on the rate of return earned by
an individual pension fund: a guarantee of a fixed minimum rate of return; and a
guarantee of a minimum rate of return that is set relative to the performance of other
pension funds.  A minimum pension benefit guarantee for a participant in a mandatory
defined contnbution  pension plan is also discussed. Costs for each of these guarantees
are illustrated using typical parameter values.
*A  detailed technical description of this research is given the working paper "The  Value
of Guarantees on Pension Fund Returns." A similar description of defined contribution
pension guarantees  as well as a review of defined benefit pension guarantees is
contained in the chapter "Government Guarantees for Old Age Income"  to be published
by the Pension Research Council of The Wharton School and the University of
Pennsylvania Press in the volume Prospects  for Social Security  Reform, Olivia Mitchell,
editor.Government Guarantees on Pension Fund Returns
Social security reform has been a serious concern to many countries.  In Latin
America, a number of reforms have been implemented by partially or fully privatizing
pension obligations.  Most often, these privatization reforms have encouraged or
required that individuals switch from a government-run defined benefit pension plan to
a privately-run defined contribution system.  A potential obstacle exists, however, in
gaining political approval for this type of reform.  By converting to a defined
contribution system, individuals may be exposed to risks not previously faced in a
government-sponsored defined benefit plan.  Participants in a defined contnbution
system risk experiencing lower than anticipated investment returns, possibly leaving
them with inadequate wealth during their retirement years.'
To make reforms involving a conversion to a defined contrbution  system more
attractive to the public, governments have typically provided guarantees that reduce
individuals' exposure to investment risks.  As a result, guarantees  of defined contnbution
pensions have recently become more common, especially in Latin America which has
been at the forefront of pension privatizations. 2 These guarantees have been of two
main types.  One type insures the periodic rates of return earned by the pension funds in
which individuals can invest  Typically,  this takes the form of a guarantee that each
defined contribution pension fund earns an annual rate of return greater than a pre-
specified minimum.  The second type of guarantee directly insures each individual's,
rather than each pension fund's, return on pension savings.  This type of guarantee
ensures that participants in a defined contnbution  system receive a minimum pension
payment throughout their retirement years, even if their pension savings are exhausted
due withdrawals during their retirement.
1Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988) discuss the relative merits of defined
contnrbution and defined benefit pension plans.  Defined contnbution  plans are
increasingly popular throughout the world.  For discussions of various countries' pension
systems, see Mitchell (forthcoming), Davis (1996), and Turner and Wantanabe (1995).
2For descriptions and critical analyses of Latin American pension reforms, see
Mitchell and Barreto (1997) and Queisser (1995).2
Because governments usually retain an insurance obligation following a pension
privatization, estimating the cost of government guarantees is important for gauging the
implicit subsidy associated with a particular pension reform.  By accounting for the cost
of pension guarantees in government budget statistics, an improved, market value-based
measure of fiscal spending can be obtained.  In addition, these cost estimates could make
feasible a system of risk-based insurance premiums that would reduce or eliminate the
subsidies from providing guarantees.
This essay presents a number of new results for valuing defined contribution
guarantees using a valuation technique known as "contingent claims analysis"(CCA).
CCA  was first used to value option contracts and corporate liabilities, but it has also
been applied to value many different types of government guarantees and insurance
contracts, such as loan guarantees, deposit insurance, and defined benefit pension
guarantees.3 It has the attractive feature of requiring relatively few assumptions in
order to value claims.  Most often, valuation requires only the assumption that
equilibrium asset prices do not allow for arbitrage.4 Assumptions regarding investor
preferences or assets' expected rates of return are not needed.
A particular method for calculating contingent claims values, known as "risk-
neutral" valuation or "martingale pricing" can be a unifying framework for valuing all
types of guarantees.  This method, introduced by Cox and Ross (1976) and further
developed by Harrison and Kreps (1979), can yield explicit formulas for guarantee values
or it can allow for numeric valuation by Monte Carlo simulation. While it is beyond the
scope of this essay to provide a detailed analysis of every possible type of pension
guarantee, the techniques it discusses can be customized to handle other specific cases.
3Contingent claims analysis, also known as "option pricing theory", derives from the
seminal work on the pricing of options by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973).
For references to applications of contingent claims analysis, see Merton (1990) chapters
1 and 19.  Pennacchi and Lewis (1994) discuss recent research on valuing defined
benefit pension guarantees.
4Arbitrage is defined as a set of financial transactions that does not require any
initial wealth and that can produce a positive profit but never a loss.  Informally, it is
sometimes referred to as a "free lunch."3
When governments guarantee private contracts, such as pension plans, adverse
selection and moral hazard problems may arise.  These incentive problems can be
alleviated by properly structuring and pricing guarantees, and/or  regulating the activities
of the parties on whose behalf the guarantee is given.  Discussions of these important
issues can be found in a number of recent papers and, due to a lack of space, will not be
repeated here.5 Because this essay's focus is on valuing guarantees, it often takes the
risk decisions of the participating parties as given.  But it should be emphasized that
these decisions are frequently linked to the guarantee's structure, pricing, or regulation.
In some cases, by estimating the costs of guarantees and then charging appropriate risk-
based insurance premiums that cover these costs, adverse selection and moral hazard
problems can be alleviated.
The plan of the essay is the following.  The next section discusses option
contracts and how pension guarantees have option-like features.  It also describes CCA
and how it can be used to value these contracts.  The following section considers two
types of pension rate of return guarantees: one being a fixed rate of return guarantee
and the other being a rate of return guarantee that is relative to the performance of
other pension funds.  In the next section a guarantee of a minimum pension benefit for a
participant in a mandatory defined contribution pension plan is considered.  Values for
these rate of return and minimum pension guarantees  are illustrated using typical
parameter values.  A concluding section then follows.  Mathematical formulas for the
guarantees discussed in the essay are given in the Appendix.
I. Options,  Guarantees,  and Confingent  Claims  Analysis
Options are examples of derivative contracts or "contingent claims." They are
financial instruments whose values depend on the prices of other assets.  Options can be
categorized into two types.  A call option  is a contract that gives its holder the right to
buy some asset at a pre-specified price at some future date.  Aput option  is a contract
that gives its holder the right to sell some asset at a pre-specified price at some future
5See Bodie and Merton (1993), Pesando (1996), and Smalhout (1996).4
date.  This pre-specified  price is referred to as the option's "exercise price" or "strike
price." Of the two types of options, put options are the most similar to guarantees.
This is Mustrated with the following example.
Suppose a defined contnbution pension fund holds a portfolio of U.S. equities
which comprise the Standard and Poor's 500 stock index (S&P500). 6 The value of the
pension fund, and therefore the value of the participants' retirement benefits, will vary
with fluctuations in the S&P500  stock index.  The pension fund can insure itself from
significant declines in the value of its stock holdings by purchasing a put option on the
S&P500. For example, assume that value of the pension fund's investments currently
equals S0 = $10 million, and it wishes to insure itself against a fall in the value of the
portfolio below X = $9 million during the next year.  It could purchase S&P500  put
options having a one-year maturity and an effective exercise price of X = $9 million. 7
If we let GI denote the value of the put option contracts (guarantees) when they
mature in one year's time, then
(1)  G1 = max  (X-  S 1,O)
where S, is the value of the pension fund's stock portfolio at the end of the year and
"max(x,y)"  means aselect the maximum of x and y." 8 Hence, the put option, being
analogous to a guarantee or insurance contract, will ultimately have a positive value
only if the end-of-year value of the pension fund's stocks, Sl, sink to less than X = $9
6The S&P500  is a market-value-weighted index of common stocks of 500 of the
largest United States corporations.
7S&P500  index options are traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange.  Each
contract is written on an underlying stock index value equal to  10 times the index.
Hence, if the S&P500  index equals 1,000, each option contract is written on an
underlying stock value of $10,000.  In this case, the pension fund would purchase 100
put option contracts having an exercise price of 900.
8Technically,  since changes in the S&P500  index do not include dividends paid by
the stocks in the index, a proper comparison would exclude from S, any dividends paid
to the pension fund during the previous year.5
million.  By owning this "portfolio insurance," the pension fund will have a combined
end-of-year value given by
(2)  Si  + G 1 = S1 + max(X-Sp,o)
=  max(X,S 1 )
so that it is guaranteed to be worth no less than X
Rather than obtaining  insurance by purchasing exchange-traded put options,
equivalent pension fund insurance might be provided by a government.  In this case, a
government guarantor would have an end-of-year liability given by G 1 = max(X-S 1,O).
Figure 1 graphs the end-of-year values of the pension fund if it were uninsured  (=S 1 ),
the guarantee  (=max(X-S 1 ,0)), and the pension fund if it were insured (=max(IX,S)).  It
is obvious that the guarantee puts a lower-bound on the end-of-year value of the insured
pension fund.
While the value of the government guarantee is easily determined at the end of
the year when  S 1 becomes known, the more challenging problem is determining its value
(cost) at the beginning of the year prior to the guarantee's maturity.  Clearly, if the
government guarantee was exactly equivalent to an exchange-traded option contract,
such as an S&P500  put  option, then its market value could be inferred from the current
market price of the S&P500 put.  However, it is rarely, if ever, the case that government
pension guarantees  have an exact private-market counterpart.  Thus, we need another
method for calculating the guarantee's theoretical market price.  This is where CCA  can
be applied.
CCA  is a method for valuing derivative-like contracts.  This valuation method has
been embraced by both  financial economists and financial market practitioners because it
is based on only a few, often realistic assumptions.  Its main requirement is that prices of
derivative contracts and their underlying securities do not allow for arbitrage
opportunities.  One need not make any particular assumptions regarding investors'
preferences, such as their degree of risk aversion, or the expected rates of return on6
derivatives or their underlying securities.  CCA  is consistent with most any set of investor
preferences or equilibrium asset expected rates of return.
One technique for calculating contingent claims values that has proven to be
quite useful is known as the "risk-neutral, valuation technique, or more generally the
umartingale pricing" approach.  This technique can be illustrated in terms of our
previous example.  Let r denote the current risk-free interest rate for borrowing or
lending over the next year.  Also let Go denote the current value (cost) of the
government guarantee contract.  Then this technique states that the guarantee's value is
given by
Go =  E  [G1
l+r
(3)
1  E*[max(X-S 1,0)1
1+r
where E*[.] is an operator that takes the expected value of its argument subject to the
condition that the expected rate of return on all assets equals the risk-free interest rate,
r.  For this reason, E*  [.] is referred to as the "risk-neutral" expectation, since only in
an economy where all investors are risk-neutral would the equilibrium rates of return on
all assets equal the risk-free rate, that is, risky assets would bear no risk-premium
Hence, in equation  (3) we would compute the expected value of max(X-S 1,0) by setting
the expected rate of return on the pension fund's stock portfolio equal to the risk rate,
that is,  E*[S 1]  = S0(1+r).
The risk-neutral expectation is denoted with an asterisk to differentiate it from
the true expectation operator, E[.].  In general, the true expected rates of return on
risky assets will not equal the risk-free rate, and it should be emphasized that this "risk-
neutral" valuation or "martingale-pricing" technique does not assume that risky asset
expected rates of return truly do equal the risk-free rate.  As stated earlier, the only
assumption being made is that equilibrium values of contingent claims and their
underlying securities do not allow for arbitrage.  It just turns out that one can compute
the arbitrage-free values of contingent claims by calculating their expected payoffs as if7
securities' expected rates of return equaled the risk-free rate and then discounting these
expected payoffs by the risk-free rate.9
Intuitively, the risk-neutral or martingale approach gives the correct value for the
government guarantee, Go,  because of two erroneous assumptions whose effects cancel
each other out, resulting in a correct valuation.  One incorrect assumption is that all
assets have an average rate of return equal to the risk-free rate, that is, there are no
"risk-premia" in asset rates of return.  This implies a "risk-neutral" expectation of
GI  =max(X-S 1 ,O) that differs from the "true" expectation of G1, leading to the first error.
The other incorrect assumption is that this risky payment should be discounted at the
risk-free rate, r, rather than a discount rate that includes a risk-premium, leading to a
second error.  Because both the first and second "errors" involve a failure to account for
risk premia, the first error "overstates" the expected value of G 1 by the risk premia
while the second error "understates" the discount factor applied to G1 by the risk
premia.  Mathematically, these two errors canceL leading to a correct valuation formula.
Importantly, because this computational technique does not require specification of the
actual risk premia of the assets in the economy, no assumptions regarding the signs or
magnitudes of risk premia are needed.
To actually calculate the guarantee value in equation (3), one must make an
assumption regarding the volatility (standard deviation) of the pension fund's stock
portfolio (but, of course, no assumption regarding its expected rate of return is needed).
If one assumes that the stock portfolio's rate of return is normally distnbuted,  computing
the risk-neutral expectation in (3) results in the well-known Black-Scholes  formula for a
put option:
(4)  Go =  l  N(-d2) - SoN(-d)
9While the proof of this result is beyond the scope of this essay, it can be shown
mathematically that this valuation technique relies only on the absence of arbitrage.  See
Kocic (1996) and Duffie (1996) for a detailed discussion of risk-neutral valuation and
the martingale pricing approach.8
where N(.) is the standard normal distnbution function, di = In[SO(1  +r)/X]/a5 + 112a,
d2 = d, - ur,  In[.]  is the natural logarithm function, and or is the annualized standard
deviation of the rate of return on the stock portfolio.
In practice, government guarantees are more complicated than the standard put
option-type guarantee in our above example. In some cases, one can apply the
martingale pricing approach derive different formulas for these more complicated
guarantees.  When exact formulas cannot be derived, one can still numerically calculate
expected payments and guarantee values using a Monte Carlo simulation technique as in
Boyle (1977).  The next two sections present examples of both types of cases.
n. Valuing  Guarantees  on a Pension  Fund's  Rate of Retum
This section considers two sorts of pension fund rate of return guarantees  made
by governments.  These guarantees can be valued by recognizing their similarity to
various types of "exotic" options, such as "forward start options," "options to
exchange one asset for another," and "options on the minimum of two risky assets."l 1
We begin by considering a relatively simple fixed minimum rate of return guarantee,
similar to one provided by Uruguay. We then consider a minimum rate of return
guarantee that depends on the average rate of return earned by all pension funds, such
as that provided by the government of Chile.
A Minimum  Fixed Rate of Retuum  Guarantee. Uruguay permits both private and public
pension funds, known as "Asociaciones  de Fondos de Ahorro Previsional" (AFAP)."
In the case of public AFAPs  (but not private AFAPs),  the govermment  guarantees to
pension fund participants a minimum annual real rate of return, denoted by m, equal to
2 percent.  Thus, a public AFAP  which earns less than 2 percent during a given year
would require a government transfer to make up the difference. By applying martingale
pricing methods, an explicit formula for the value of these annual rate of return
guarantees can be obtained.  The derivation, given in Pennacchi (1997), makes use of
° 0For a description and analysis of these exotic options, see Hull (1997).
"See  Mitchell (1996) for a discussion of pension system reform in Uruguay.9
the similarity between these guarantees and forward start options.
A forward start option is an option having a random exercise price when the
option is first issued.  The exercise price is set equal to the contemporaneous value of
the underlying asset at some future date prior to the maturity date of the option.  In
other words, the option's exercise price is set to make it "at-the-money" at a pre-
specified future date.  The analogy between  a rate of return guarantee and a forward
start option is that a (continuously compounded) rate of return on an asset over some
future interval, say from date t1 to time t2, needs to be computed based on two future
asset values: In[S(t2)] - ln[S(tl)],  where S(t) is the value of the (pension fund) asset at
date t.  Since, in general, the t1 beginning date of the rate of return is in the future,
S(t 1) is unknown and analogous to the unknown beginning exercise price of the forward
start option.
The formula for the minimum rate of return guarantee, listed in the Appendix,
equals a weighted annual series of "at-the-money" Black and Scholes (1973) type put
options, where the weights are proportional to the assumed growth in net new
contributions to the pension fund.  The value of this guarantee depends on the
difference between the risk-free rate and the guaranteed rate of return, r-m, as well as
the rate of return standard deviation of the pension fund, us. Figure 2 plots the annual
percentage cost of the guarantee per value of pension fund assets, lOOxGO/So,  as a
function of r-m for four different values of as. The first value, as = 0, reflects the case in
which the AFAP  invests entirely in risk-free real assets, earning a certain rate of return
equal to r.  The next three cases reflect risky AFAP  investments.  Because social security
reform was enacted in Uruguay only in 1995, and data on AFAP  returns is not yet
available, the non-zero values of or that we use reflect a parameter estimate taken from
Chilean pension fund retums, namely us =  .038, .077, and .154, which represents one
half, once, and twice the average of all Chilean pension funds.  This was estimated from
annual data on Chilean pension fund returns  for the period 1981 to 1992, as reported in
Diamond and Valdes-Prieto (1994, p.300).
As would be expected, Figure 2 shows that the cost of the guarantee rises with
the volatility of the AFAP's  investments, us, and decreases as the difference between the10
real interest rate and the minimum guarantee, r-m, widens.  Note that  the function
becomes more convex as volatility decreases, and for the case of as = 0, the relation is
kinked at r-m = 0.  This limiting case reflects the common sense result that if the AFAP
invests in risk free assets earning r, then the value of the guarantee equals zero for m <
r, but the value of the guarantee is nonrandom and equal to 100x(m-r) for m > r.
Another important insight from the guarantee formula is that if a single annual
guarantee has any value and the real growth rate of the pension fund is non-negative,
the value of the annual series of guarantees will grow without bound as the number of
future years for which this guarantee is made increases.  A policy implication is that
governments should be quite cautious in providing such a guarantee to funds that are
expected to grow substantially.
A Minimum Relative Rate of Return Guarantee.  In Chile, private pension funds, known
as "Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones" (AFPs),  are required to earn an annual
real rate of return that is linked to the average annual real rate of return of all private
pension funds.  If Ra is the (ex-post) average annual rate of return earned by all AFPs,
then each AFP must earn at least min(Ra-a, I3Ra) where a  = .02,1, = 1/2,  and 'min(x,y)"
means select the minimum of x and y.  Thus, if Ra tums out to be greater
than 4 percent, each AFP must earn at least '/2Ra, while if Ra turns out to be less
than 4 percent, each AFP must earn at least Ra - 2 percent.  All AFPs are required to
hold capital (a guarantee fund) of at least 1 percent of the value of its pension portfolio,
invested in the same security portfolio as that of its pension fund.  If the fund's return is
less than min(Ra-a, PRa), it must make up the difference from its capital and replenish
its capital within 15 days.  The AFP's  license would be revoked if it fails to do so.  Thus,
given an AFP capital ratio of c = .01, the government would be exposed to loss
following an AFP  that earns less than min(Ra-a, PRa) - c = min(Ra-a-c,  PRa-c).
This government guarantee for an individual AFP is similar to an annual series of
options to exchange the individual AFP's  pension assets for the minimum of two other
risky assets.  The formula for the cost of this guarantee is listed in the Appendix and is
derived by Pennacchi using results in Margrabe (1978), Stulz (1982), and Johnson11
(1987).  As one might expect, the value of this relative rate of return guarantee is
sensitive to the standard  deviation of the individual AFP's  rate of return as well as the
correlation between the individual AFP's  return and the average return of all AFPs.
Figure 3 plots the annual cost of this Chilean guarantee as a percentage of the
current value of the pension fund assets, 1OOxGISo. This is done for different assumed
correlations between individual AFP and average AFP retums.  The guarantee value is
shown for three cases: when the individual AFP standard deviation equals, is twice, or is
one-half that  of the average of AFPs. As would be expected, the value of the guarantee
falls as the correlation rises.  Interestingly, when the standard deviation of the individual
AFP's  return exceeds that  of the average of AFPs (which should be the case for the
typical AFP since individual risk is diversified by averaging), then even when the
correlation is perfect, the guarantee will have positive value.
M. Valuing  Minimum  Pension Guarantees  for Defined Contiabution  Plans
This section considers the value of a minimum pension guarantee for a
participant in a mandatory defined contnbution  pension system, where a fixed
proportion of a worker's wage is assumed to be contnbuted to a pension fund that earns
risky returns.  Two previous studies, both estimating the value of this guarantee for the
case of Chile, should be noted.  Wagner (1991), whose results are summarized in
Diamond and Valdes-Prieto (1994), values this guarantee by simulating its annual cost
when the demographics and maturity of the pension system are at their steady state
values. The model calculates this cost under different assumptions regarding the real
rate of return on pension  fund assets and the level of the minimum pension guarantee.
Another study by Zarita (1994) applies contingent claims techniques to value Chile's
minimum pension guarantee.  His model explicitly allows for a stochastic rate of return
on pension fund assets, so that a worker's accumulated pension savings at retirement is
random.  If the worker's savings at retirement is less than the cost of an annuity
providing the minimum pension, the govenmment  is assumed to make a payment to cover
the difference. The risk-neutral expected value of this govemment payment is calculated
using a Monte Carlo simulation of the worker's risky pension investment assuming a12
deterministic level of wage contributions each period and a constant real interest rate.
The approach taken in this section is similar to that of Zarita (1994) but indudes
a number of extensions.  First, in addition to allowing pension retums to be stochastic,
we also allow a worker's real wage, and thus his monthly pension contribution, to follow
a random process.  The evolution of real wages is also assumed to influence the
minimum pension set by the government when the worker retires.  Second, real interest
rates are assumed to follow a stochastic process.  This is potentially important since
retirement annuity values are a function of real interest rates.  In addition, valuing the
government's guarantee requires that real interest rates discount the government's
guarantee payments and, in general, these payments are systematically  related to not
only asset returns and wage levels, but also the real interest rate.
Third, we model the government's payments for a minimum pension in a
different, arguably more realistic manner.  Upon reaching retirement, a retiree may have
a choice regarding his benefit payments.  If he has suffident pension savings, he may
choose to dose his pension account and use his savings to purchase a lifetime annuity
that provides a benefit at or above the minimum pension.  Alternatively, he can maintain
his pension account and receive benefits by a scheduled withdrawal of funds from his
account.  For a retiree with an account balance insufficient to purchase a minimum
pension annuity, a scheduled withdrawal of funds is required.  The maximum amount
that a retiree can withdraw each year is determined by a government schedule that
depends on the retiree's cuirent pension balance and the value of a lifetime annuity,
where this annuity is calculated using the government's "technicalP  interest rate.  If and
when a retiree's pension account balance is exhausted, the government guarantees that it
will pay him the minimum monthly pension for the remainder of his life.
As discussed in Turner and Wantanabe (1995), and Smalhout (1996), a worker
that reaches retirement with a pension balance that is slightly above or at the price of a
minimum pension annuity will have an incentive to not purchase an annuity but to
choose the scheduled withdrawal option.  By choosing this scheduled withdrawal, he will
receive free longevity insurance at the government's expense.  Should he live longer than
expected, the government provides him with a minimum pension.  If, instead, he lives13
less than expected, his heirs will inherit the balance of his pension account.  Thus, in
some states of the world, he receives a government subsidy that would not occur if he
had immediately purchased a lifetime annuity.  Hence, for someone reaching retirement
with moderate to small pension savings, which is the individual most likely to require
minimum pension assistance, it is more realistic to assume a scheduled withdrawal of
pension funds.  Unlike Zarita (1994), the results reported in this section explicitly
consider this scheduled withdrawal.
The following is a brief summary of the model which is detailed in Pennacchi
(1997).  It is based on three random processes: the rate of return on pension fund assets,
the growth in real wages, and the change in the short term real interest rate.  These
three processes may be correlated.  This short term real interest rate determines the term
structure of real yields based on the Vasicek (1977) modeL An additional minor source
of uncertainty is the individual's mortality.  The probability of death at each age is
assumed to be uncorrelated with economic variables and is taken from Chile's official life
table.  A hypothetical male worker is assumed to begin maldng pension contnbutions at
age 20 and, should he live until the retirement age of 65, begin a scheduled withdrawal
of his pension savings at the maximum level allowed by law.  The worker's mandatory
monthly contnbution  equals 10 percent of his randomly evolving wage and is invested in
his pension fund earning a random rate of return.
At retirement,  the maximum that can be withdrawn each month is calculated
following the actual Chilean govenment  formula, which is described in Diamond and
Valdes-Prieto (1994, p. 290).  This formula's  mim  =7 withdrawal is, however, truly
the maximum only if it exceeds the government's minimum pension level.  If not, the
amount withdrawn is equal to the minimum pension.  This occurs until the retiree's
pension account is exhausted, should he live that long.  After the account balance is
exhausted, the govermment  pays the minimum pension until the end of the retiree's life.
The minimum pension is set at the discretion of the government, and it depends
on a number of political and economic factors.  For simplicity, the model assumes that
the minimum pension at the beginning of an individual's retirement follows the formula:
minimum pension  =  ¼/4*(average  wage at start of individual's working life)*(growth in14
the individual's real wages over his working life)  *1/2. This assumed formula reflects the
likelihood that the government will tend to raise the minimum pension should real
wages (and the standard of living) rise.  Since Turner and Wantanabe (1995, p. 210)
report that the minimum pension is approximately 25 percent of the average wage and
because our model assumes that the individual's real wage will almost double over his
45 years of work (1.5 percent average annual growth), the formula should maintain a
minimum pension-average wage ratio of approximately 25 percent.'2
Once again, the martingale approach is used to value this guarantee.  The three
random process are transformed into "risk-neutral, counterparts so that the guarantee's
value can be computed as the expectation of the government's discounted minimum
pension payments.  This expectation is calculated using a Monte Carlo simulation, where
contributions or withdrawals from the individual's pension fund account occur each
month.  Parameter values typical of Chile were used and are given in Pennacchi (1997).
Guarantee values are calculated for the case of a 20 year-old male beginning
wage earner starting with a zero pension fund balance.  Mortality is based on the
Chilean life tables for male annuitants.  Assuming  an average Chilean monthly real wage
of 100 at the time this individual begins work, we find that the average level of the
inimum  pension set by the government (according to the formula discussed above) at
the worker's retirement  date was 44.7.
Figure 4 graphs the present values of the minimum pension guarantee for this
20 year-old worker for different initial monthly wages ranging between 10 and 100. The
value of this guarantee ranges from 251.8 for an individual with an initial monthly wage
of 10 to 5.8 for an individual with an initial monthly wage of 100.  The shape of the
12One component of the lifetime growth of an individual's real wage is likely to
reflect increased (economy-wide) average productivity, while another component should
reflect the individual's increased productivity due greater experience and seniority.  Thus,
it is reasonable to expect that an individual's lifetime real wage growth will exceed the
economy-wide average.  For this reason, the formula includes a final factor of one-half.
The result is that our simulations give an average minimum pension at the individual's
retirement  date equal to 44.7 percent of the initial average real wage, implying that, on
average, there is a slightly less than doubling (from 25 percent) of the minimum
pension.15
relationship is convex as one might expect given the put option-like nature of this
guarantee.  Also plotted in Figure 4 is the individual's age at which his pension fund
account would be depleted, should he live that long.  This ranges from age 72.1 for an
initial wage of 10 to age 91.8 for an initial wage of 100.  Note that this age proffle has a
concave shape.  Higher initial wages increase the time before the pension account is
depleted, but less than proportionally.  While higher initial wages tend to result in
proportionally higher accumulated pension savings at retirement, the govemments
scheduled withdrawal formula allows greater pension withdrawals for individuals with
higher savings. Thus the withdrawal schedule tends to subdue the effect that greater
retirement savings have on the age at which pension funds are depleted.
IV.  Conclusions
Pension privatizations frequently require that individuals contribute to defined
contnrbution pension plans.  However, when contributions to these pension plans are
mandatory, individuals will be subject to investment risks that they did not previously
face in a government-sponsored defined benefit plan.  To make privatization reforms
politically attractive to the public, governnents  have typically offered guarantees that
reduce individuals' exposure to investment risks.
Recent advances in contingent claims analysis have provided important insights
for valuing pension guarantees.  This essay ilustrates  how the martingale pricing
approach, also known as the risk-neutral valuation method, can be applied to value a
variety of guarantees on pension fund retumns. Perhaps the most attractive feature of
this approach is the relatively few assumptions needed to calculate guarantee values.
The main restriction imposed by this approach is that equilibrium asset prices do not
allow for arbitrage opportunities.
This paper analyzed guarantees at a microeconomic leveL  It considered the
values of defined contnbution rate of return guarantees for individual pension funds and
the value of a minimum pension guarantee for an individual worker in a defined
contibution  pension system. A potential benefit of this ability to value individual
guarantees is that a system of risk-based insurance (guarantee) premiums might be16
established.  Requiring that riskier pension funds, and possibly riskier individuals, pay
higher insurance premiums could help control adverse selection and moral hazard
behavior.  It would reduce the subsidies and the economic distortions associated with
government guarantees.  The potential for reducing such distortions through risk-based
premiums may ultimately change the type of pension system that a government chooses
to adopt.
The ability to price guarantees can also allow government budgets to be
measured on a market-value basis.  A governmenfs total liability from providing
guarantees can be calculated by aggregating the values of individual guarantees.13
This aggregation requires detailed data on the economy's individual pension funds,
and/or worker demographics.  While such an exercise was beyond the scope of this
essay, the analysis presented here provides a foundation for obtaining a more accurate
indicator of government fiscal policy.
13A similar aggregation is performed in Cooperstein, Pennacchi, and Redbum (1995),
where the aggregate value of deposit insurance is calculated by aggregating the values of
deposit insurance provided to individual banks.17
Appendix
This appendix lists guarantee formulas for the (Uruguayan) mirimum fixed rate
of return guarantee and the (Chilean) minimum relative rate of return guarantee.
Derivation of these formulas is given in Pennacchi (1997).
Minimum  Fixed Rate of Retun  Guarantee
Define h(T) as
(A.1)  h(r)  = e(=mts)N(-d)  - N(-di)
where di  = (r - m + 1/2a5)T/(S  ) and  d2 = di  - o A/;  Also assume that the
pension fund is growing due to net new contnbutions at a proportional real growti  rate
of g.  Then if a govennment makes this guarantee on an annual basis (-=1)  for n
consecutive years, the total value of the guarantee, H., is
(A.2)  Hn  = Soh(l) E euY
Y=O
Minimum  Relative Rate of Retum Guaantee
Let ua  and  aa  be the standard deviations of the rate of return on the individual
guaranteed AFP and on the average of all AFPs,  respectively, and let p be the
instantaneous  correlation between the individual AFP's  portfolio return and that of the
average of all AFPs. Then define h('r) as18
h(t)  = e+  N,  C,,  q1-qv  _ ½o/W Pr 2o2
-av  +  q  Pa  1al
(A.3)  + e  +  N2a,  q2 q 1-½/2o  ,
a2l E  aW  a
- N2  |  -r  - 1/ 2 g1 a  /T,.L  _1/2  (oz,  P i2 J
where N2(.,.,.)  is the bivariate normal distribution functions, qx=a+c,  q,=(1-3)r  + c,
2  2  2- 
G1  - ( 0a  +  a2  - 2 pa  aus,  a.  + a  - 2p13 c7as, and
2  -undIi(gro1ng2).
P 12 =  (13  a - aaYsP(l  + 1)  + aS)/(clc2)-  Assume that the pension fund is growing due
to net new contrbutions  at a proportional real growth rate of g.  Then  if a government
makes this guarantee on an annual basis (T=1) for n consecutive  years, the total value
of the guarantee, H., is
(A-4)  H.  = Soh(l)  egy
Y=O19
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